Introduction
I shall argue for a sufficientist understanding of reasonableness in legal decisionmaking: cognitive or moral optimality are not required for reasonableness; what needed is just that a determination-be it epistemic or practical-is sufficiently good (acceptable, or at least not unacceptable). Correspondingly, judicial review on the ground of unreasonableness requires more than mere suboptimality: it requires failure to achieve the reasonableness threshold.
To develop this idea, I shall first analyse the notions of rationality and reasonableness, examining the role they play in cognition. I shall then consider rationality in legal (and in particular legislative) decision-making, focusing on teleological reasoning. I shall consequently develop an idea of sufficientist reasonableness, by combining the idea of bounded rationality with the idea of deference, as required by institutional coordination in the legal process. Finally, I shall consider when a legislative determination can be considered irrational or unreasonable, and how this is related to the violation of constitutional requirements.
Reasonableness and Rationality
The concept of reasonableness is often understood as having a larger content (intension) and thus a smaller extension than the concept of rationality understood as cognitive optimality: in order to be qualified as reasonable, a practical determination would need to be both rational and moral. This makes reasonable practical determinations a subset of rational determinations, those qualified by morality (the 18 G. Sartor   Fig. 1 Sufficientist reasonableness differentia specifica of reasonableness within the genus of rationality), and also a subset of moral determinations, those qualified by rationality (the differentia specifica of reasonableness within the genus of morality).
However, a different characterisation is possible, based on sufficiency rather than on optimality: reasonableness pertains to determinations that are good enough though not necessarily optimal; reasonable choices need to "satisfice"; they are not required to maximise (on the notion of satisficing, see Simon 1983). This sufficientist understanding of reasonableness, combined with the idea that practical reasonableness requires both morality and rationality, entails that reasonable practical determinations need to be both rational enough and moral enough, as shown in Fig. 1 . Figure 2 illustrates the connection among sufficientist practical reasonableness, rationality, and morality. The oval of the reasonable includes the practical optimum, 
